Книга посвящена той своеобразной политической «футурологии», каковой являются сегодня взгляды россиян на будущее и место в нем нашего Отечества. Исторические судьбы России крепко увязываются здесь с тремя основополагающими моментами: местом страны в общемировом цивилизационном процессе, ее способностью возродиться в ранге великой державы и выбором таких социальных механизмов и политических сил, которые в состоянии были бы обеспечить решение двух первых глобальных задач. Исследование адресовано ученым-обществоведам, преподавателям, аспирантам, студентам вузов, участникам, организаторам и активистам избирательных кампаний — всем, кто интересуется проблемами развития российского общества и состоянием народных умонастроений.


Word-версия



В.П. Пешков. Россия XXI века в системе общественно-политических ожиданий. — М.: Издательство «Русский летописец» Центра исследований политической культуры России, 2000. — 154 с.

ISBN 5-93360-016-4
ББК С.555.511.я46

Сдано в набор 05.01.2000. Подписано в печать 01.02.2000.
Формат 60х90 1/16. Гарнитура Петербург.
Усл. печ. л. 11,7. Уч-изд. л. 13.
Тираж 2000 экз. (2-й завод 1001 – 2000 экз.)

© Пешков В.П., 2000.
© Центр исследований политической культуры России. Издательство «Русский летописец», 2000.
© Шкерин В.Е., оформление, 2000.


Выходные данные
Введение
Summary


ВВЕДЕНИЕ

Эта книга посвящена будущему. Что, конечно же, не ново. Попытки заглянуть за исторический «горизонт» — под самыми разными углами зрения, от аналитического до поэтического, — предпринимались всегда. Уходящий век был ими особенно обилен. Причем, начиная с далеких уже от нас 50-60-х годов, когда футурология — и на Западе, и в СССР, и в социалистических странах — стала складываться в своеобразную отрасль знания и возникла сеть соответствующих аналитических структур, интеллектуальные усилия в данной области устремлялись преимущественно в двух главных направлениях. В капиталистических государствах, и особенно в США, господствовало стремление как можно подробнее и точней выявить набор вероятных угроз, поджидающих в грядущем, дабы изыскать (в частности) средства и пути, помогающие их избежать. Достаточно вспомнить такие беллетризированные образцы этого творчества, как книги О. Хаксли «Этот прекрасный новый мир» или Д. Оруэлла «1984», сделавшиеся было популярными и в нашем обществе во времена «перестройки». Футурология играла здесь роль прежде всего социально-политического предупреждения. В собственно же советском случае все выстраивалось внешне похоже, но по существу во многом иначе. Попытки заглянуть в будущее призваны были не пугать, а, наоборот, воодушевлять народ, формируя для него общественный идеал — гипотетическую модель коммунистического либо приближающегося к нему социально-политического устройства. Которая нередко выполняла и роль броской и интеллектуально проработанной (даже в деталях) иллюстрации для тех или других партийных и государственных документов и решений.

Однако при всех очевидных различиях — во многом принципиального характера — оба указанных потока футурологических изысканий создавались чаще всего творчеством конкретных специалистов-исследователей, исходивших из собственного, хотя и аналитически проработанного, но весьма личного и субъективного видения общественных перспектив. Что в значительной мере сближало подобного рода прогнозы с классическими трудами таких писателей-философов, как, например, Т. Кампанелла с его «Городом Солнца» или Г. Уэллс со знаменитой «Машиной времени».

Предлагаемая вниманию читателей работа носит иной характер. В ее основе лежит не опрокинутое в будущее личное (или ограниченно коллективное) авторское восприятие настоящего, а целостный анализ массовых, народных взглядов на грядущее. Выявляется та их во многом стихийно складывающаяся равнодействующая, что, влияя и на общественную атмосферу вообще, и на поведение тех, кто «делает политику», в частности, на свой лад воздействует на конечный выбор путей национального и государственного развития.

Предметом изучения здесь является прежде всего то, что принято называть «образом будущего» — представление о своей судьбе целого народа: какими видятся ему, исходя из особенностей текущих дней, наиболее вероятные его жизненные перспективы, с одной стороны, и какую судьбу он хотел бы — в идеале — получить для себя, с другой. А также: как следовало бы поступить, чтобы худшая из проглядывающих здесь виртуальностей не состоялась, а лучшая получила шанс на возможно более полную реализацию…

Конечно, чтобы воссоздать и проанализировать во всем многообразии ту картину грядущего, что объективно складывается в народном мировосприятии, пришлось бы экстраполировать в будущее по сути дела каждый из сколь-либо значимых элементов сегодняшнего дня. А это — практически невыполнимая задача. Тем более — при нынешней базе социологических (опросных) источников. Хронологически ограниченная пределами последнего десятилетия, во многом случайная и разрозненная из-за отрывочности доступных сведений, она не включает в себя сколь-либо целостного массива искомых данных. Сведенные в нашей книге воедино материалы самых разных исследовательских центров, полученные в результате многих и подчас совсем не схожих по их исходным целям зондажей, позволяют лишь контурно наметить и аналитически рассмотреть узловые моменты той панорамы будущего, что рисуется сегодня в представлениях россиян.



SUMMARY

This book is dedicated to what is commonly called «future vision» – mass opinion about the time to come. It shows how the Russians basing on the peculiarities of the present situation see their most probable perspectives and, from the other side, what life they would like to have for themselves and their country. And more: what is to be done to prevent the worst fate and let the best destiny be realised.

It is shown here that one of the dominant sensations in the society is that the reforms in the country resulted in fiasco and that Russia fall dawn into a kind of dark and remote past almost into the epochs of middle ages and feudal disunity.

Disintegration of the USSR, downfall of the Soviet social system, brake of the usual values and orientations in spite of prevailing forecasts of futurologists shocked the Russians. The future and especially the near future lost its attraction for many people. The main tasks for the decisive part of the population became individual and – at the same time – state survival.

The destiny of Russia as historic phenomenon is tied in their notions with three basic moments: place of the country in the world civilisation process, its ability to preserve integrity and revive as a great power as well as search for the social mechanism and political forces capable of providing realisation of the first two global tasks.

The future prepared for Russia by the forces that ruled in the country during last ten years is rejected as a whole.

At the same time the public opinion did not permit to be frightened by such threats as a perspective of conflict between Russians and Muslims resulting from the antiterrorist operation in Chechnya. «If we resign under pressure of different kinds of separatists and semicriminal regimes in the regions, declare two thirds of the citizens, and continue spineless policy which humiliates Russia we will be really insulted, oppressed and beaten by everybody. Only strong Russia is a guarantor of secure and peaceful life of its people». But according to the sociologic research this conclusion does not develop to xenophobia, hatred against «strangers».

Much harder are positions of Russians in the matters of international character. It is not an artificial «enemy image» that is being formed in the mass mind but an instinct of national self-preservation.. Events around Iraq and Yugoslavia had stimulated this mood. Three thirds of citizens insisted on diplomatic assistance to Yugoslavia but every forth was in favour of direct military help to that country.

Growing threat from outside – widening of NATO, extermination of the states traditionally allied to Russia, ignorance of its geopolitical interests made majority of Russians believe that a new state union is needed both on the basis of the destroyed USSR and on a broader foundation. So the alliance with Byelorussia is firmly supported by nearly three forth of the citizens and the union with the Ukraine by each three of five. Not less than one quarter of Russia’s inhabitants also supports the idea of wide geopolitical alliance with Yugoslavia, Iraq, India, China.

A mighty power feeling called sometimes imperial is re-emerging. «In the face of growing threat from outside it is useful to remind the world that despite everything we are great imperial power which in any case will raise from the knees. One should be proud of such imperial essence of Russia», began declaring not less than 60-70 per cent of Russians at the sociologic sampling.

Emergence of such tasks began testing actively the stability of practically all the institutions which determine appearance of the national state and may change it in one or another direction.

There are different ways that bring people to understand what are abilities of different political organisations to become true representative of Russia’s future, a principal social force of present time, capable to work out an action program opening its way to the future.

The core of the political program of the 21st century which may count with support of the three fourth of people is following: to return to people everything taken away from it under the years of «perestroika and reforms», comprising ownership and peoples power; to keep away from the state affairs all those who betrayed the country; to put an end to the separatist tendencies.

The only question is to determine which is the party, movement, block of forces or leader to be associated with this program by the people. That was the object of most tenacious social and political struggle at the verge of the centuries.

The traditional «democratic» forces concentrating around B.Yeltsin found themselves in severe crises. The core of this crises turned to be degradation of the charismatic image of the president. «Yeltsin will be able to preserve the president’s chair only by manoeuvres among different forces and he will betray his supporters one after another according to circumstances». This point of view became dominant in the country supported by nearly half of the population.

Each second Russian who tried to determine possibilities of the «democrats» predicted that they would be bankrupt in the nearest future (though they could be preserved as a force near the power) or that having completely destroyed economy and social sphere they would be thrown aside from the leadership and become a kind of a third-rate force.

The organisations that inherited the «old» Yeltsin «ruling party» do not succeed with their attempts to become leading force of the Russian society. They try to play a role of «the third force» which is said to be able to lead the country «between» the capitalist and socialist alternatives represented correspondingly by «The Family» of president Yeltsin and the CPRF with its allies. Until the end of 1999 non of these parties (with the exception of «Fatherland – All Russia» block formed around Y.Luzhkov and E.Primakov) could be accepted as such by the people. A considerable part of those sympathisers of such structures as «Yabloko», LDPR or PRPR – 40-60 per cent for each — agreed that Russia lacked «political organisations oriented towards the future». In other words not a small part of the mass basis of many Russian parties felt themselves merely as their fellow-travellers and developed relations with them only on a provisional basis awaiting more acceptable alternatives.

For example up to two thirds of Russians commented the prospects of Zhirinovsky’s party in following way: LDPR would expose itself as a satellite of the ruling forces and therefore was only a temporary phenomenon which has to inevitably disappear.

There were but 5-6 per cent of population who considered Yabloko as a future ruling force in Russia. About third part of the population gave due estimation to the party of Yavlinsky for its constant critical approach both to the «ruling party» of Yeltsin and the opposing forces around the Communist party. At the same time nearly half of the citizens shared the forecast: «Yavlinsky and his associates could do nothing: they were and would be a limited, not influential party representing a part of the intellectuals»…

The personal rating of the leaders of the block «Fatherland – All Russia» reached record level in autumn 1999 but in spite of very well-wishing attitude of the Russians the image of the organisation has not got a stable core. It is split in many and often controversial characteristics of the same scale. Reliance on Luzhkov’s patriotism (especially in matters concerning destiny of the Crimea), the contacts with the Orthodox church, defence of Russian culture all this was often opposed by just as big distrust of the people who considered it to be but a cynic political advertisement. And it proved to be not so difficult to undermine the unstable image of the FAR.

The image of the CPRF was formed as more firm and definite. Many anticommunist fears were dispersed at the edge of the XXI century. For example only 2,6 per cent of the Russians went on to link its eventual coming to power with return of mass repression, new Gulag. Other 12 per cent were afraid of total nationalisation. «The communists have understood and learnt much during passed tragic years, meant about half of the voters before the Duma elections of 1999. They would not try reversing the wheel of history, they will be able to renew the society and return to the state and people everything stolen as a result of privatisation… They will be able to secure such position of the country in the world that nobody will try to ignore its will».

But realisation of this image in political and electoral practice turned to be extremely complicated task for CPRF.

The changes in the social situation after regular parliamentary elections, appearance of new political forces represented by «Unity» and the Union of right forces, retirement of president Yeltsin and birth of the «Putin phenomenon», a new charismatic personality in the ruling camp, have deeply changed the situation in the country. It seemed to many people that Putin’s appearance meant nothing else but realisation of the old dream about a new, yet unknown, leader who comes at the decisive moment and saves the country opening its way to the future. And though the highest personal rating of the acting president (reaching 50 per cent) was explained exceptionally by the authority of the antiterrorist action in Chechnya (while all the others Putin’s steps were supported by not more than 20 per cent of the population) it became clear that Russia entered a new turn of social struggle promising also repetition of many problems and situations known from the 1990th. Personalisation of policy typical for its life received new mighty impulse which may be followed by a long brake in the real democratisation of the society.